October 28th, 2001, 8:26 pm
numbersix, I think you might be on to something. I find that most report median spreads, presumably because the a few distressed issues can wreck arithmetic averages. I take averages for only issues with spreads below 2000 bps above libor. This generates an unfortunate dichotomy in that I generate nonparametric spread expectations *assuming* no distressed, and this exception is more material the higher the spread. In sum, I see a dilemma: use all spreads, and get spreads that are on average too high, ignore distressed issues and understate the true expected spread. It is as though once a company enters a distressed regime its price (spread) uses a different pricing function, but one can't reason backward to incorporate this probability in its current price--its current state is either distressed or nondistressed, and one reasons backward only using the current regime status. Further, the arbitrary definition of the distressed exclusion rule affects the averages materially.By grade, using data from 10/12/01 using about 1000 US nonfinancial issuers, I get the following spreads & probability of being distressed (defined as having a spread>2000 bps):rating % distressed spread to libor (bps)AAA 0.0% 38AA1 0.0% 41AA2 0.0% 45AA3 0.0% 51A1 0.0% 84A2 0.0% 114A3 0.0% 136BBB1 0.0% 162BBB2 0.0% 211BBB3 0.0% 306BB1 0.0% 457BB2 2.6% 536BB3 1.3% 633B1 11.4% 752B2 19.6% 974B3 29.4% 1100CCC1 56.8% CCC2 66.7% CCC3 75.0% CC 83.3%