November 22nd, 2001, 5:39 pm
Even setting aside practical difficulties of defining what constitutes a speculative flow, administering the tax collection process and so on, there is a deeper problem with Tobin taxes. This is that the equilibrium tax rate is vanishingly small.Suppose that all governments reached an agreement to charge a Tobin tax of x%. In this case any single government would then have an incentive to charge only half of x%. In the absence of significant sunk costs of transferring FX dealing operations, all speculative flows would then go through the country that charged only half of x%, thus leading to a huge increase in tax revenues for the government of that country. Other governments would then decide to charge only a quarter of x% and so on until a very low equilibrium tax rate asserted itself. However, even then there are two further problems. One is that the administrative costs of collecting the tax may then exceed the tax revenues thus giving governments an incentive not to bother collecting the Tobin tax.The second issue is that, from a government's point of view, there is a 'public good' value associated with having speculative flows go through your country. Speculative flows going through your country means having a significant number of financial institutions in your country, and therefore increased corporation tax receipts, increased income tax receipts, a multiplier effect through the economy from the spending of the corporations and individuals involved in managing speculative flows, and so on and so forth.Therefore, even if practical issues could be dealt with, the equilibrium rate of the Tobin tax is very low. By the time admin costs and public good value are introduced, the incentive for governments to introduce a Tobin tax is zero.But that's just what I think ...