August 19th, 2009, 3:49 am
Hi ClosetChartist,I thought you had some very interesting comments, and I was hoping to discuss these points a little further... QuoteOriginally posted by: ClosetChartistmarkhadley:Your general advice is reflected in several US consulting firms' annuity hedging platforms: multi-factor Hull-White, emphasis on fund basis mapping, Heston equity volatility, emerging interest in credit spread basis, etc.This generic platform misses the heart of insurance-linked risk, however:1. GMxB liabilities have far more rate optionality than simple discount exposure. Some, like GMIB, even have hard rate optionality. THIS MEANS THAT INSURANCE LIABILITES ARE SIGNIFICANLTY MORE SENSITIVE TO RATE VOLATILITY THAN YOU HAVE PRESUMED. This was the heart of haojiew's initial posting in this thread.Could you elaborate? It's well-known that a GMIB has hard rate optionality. Are you saying that the generic platforms from the consultants ignore the life annuity rate guarantees embedded in GMIB options? That would be surprising.Also, how does your comment apply to products that do NOT have hard interest rate optionality (such as GMDB and GMAB)? In every model, the risk-free rate scenarios are used as the drift in risk-neutral underlying dynamics and the same scenarios are used for discounting cash-flows. What else is there? It would seem to me that this is fully capturing the sensitivity of liabilities to movements in interest rates. Now the the chosen stochastic interest rate model might be flawed but that is a separate issue from the nature of option value's exposure to interest rates.QuoteOriginally posted by: ClosetChartistmarkhadley:2. Heston can't begin to capture the long-dated skews you see in practice when you go to hedge these risks. Furthermore, your dealers aren't using Heston and you will be blown out of the water when you see actual hedge costs.From what I understand, you are saying that the historical implied volatility surface for equities has statistical behavior in the long-end that cannot be properly captured by the Heston model. Could you explain exactly which empirical feature of this "long-dated skew" makes the Heston model inappropriate? Is there something special about the long end of the vol surface that makes the Heston model inappropriate, or are you saying that the Heston model just doesn't work at any maturity?Also, what model ARE the dealers using? Why does it even matter what model they are using? Is the dealer's model the "one true model" since it is the the dealer who sets bid/ask prices? What if different dealers are using different models? Finally, you say that the dealer quotes for long-dated volatility are very expensive, which means that hedging the implied vol exposure is very costly. That may be true nowadays, but why would high cost of hedging by itself be an indicator of a correct or incorrect model? If the models and dealer quotes indicate that the cost of hedging the risks are very high then doesn't simply indicate that the direct writers need to raise GMxB insurance premiums? QuoteOriginally posted by: ClosetChartistmarkhadley:3. Most consulting firms superficially model credit spreads rather than the underlying default risk. This is a useful approach for modeling asset portfolios but a rather dangerous and inadequate approach for modeling derivative portfolios. The distribution matters.Where do these credit spreads enter the model? A portion of the underlying basket in a GMxB option is often a bond fund (mutual fund). Are you are talking about using credit spreads to model the bond fund NAV stochastic process? And are you proposing that the bond fund NAV dynamics should be based on a model of corporate bond defaults? Roughly, what would such a default risk model look like? What is wrong with just assuming that the bond fund value is determined by the risk-free term structure of interest rates plus a credit spread? I would wager that the most common approach in the insurance industry is to just pretend that the bond funds are equity funds (i.e. they pretend that bond fund value behaves just like a stock price). I think that simply moving away from pretending that the bond fund as a portfolio of stocks would be one giant leap for the industry. Of course another solution is to never sell options on managed bond funds in the first place. QuoteOriginally posted by: ClosetChartistmarkhadley:4. Unlike financial derivatives where underlying, exercise, and maturity are known with certainty, the structure of insurance-linked GMxB guarantees is random and market linked. These dynamics create additional market exposures that are invisible to the market models you have proposed. This may be why some insurance companies are reporting poor hedging results.Not knowing the underlying with certainty is an insane problem that the industry has created for itself. The solution is very simple: know the underlying with certainty (but good luck convincing the actuaries who dream up these monstrosities). QuoteOriginally posted by: ClosetChartistmarkhadley:5. The whole concept of real-world stochastic projections is overblown. Because it is difficult to do, it is assumed to be really valuable, when in fact you are simply computing statistics about a model that has little to do with reality in the first place. Carefully constructed sensitivity tests and single-scenario analysis are far easier to calculate, far more easily understood, far more accurate/useful, and far less expensive to produce.If real-world stochastic projections provide statistics about a model that has little to do with reality then wouldn't sensitivity tests and single-scenario real-world projections also just be statistics about a model that has little to do with reality? Either the model is useful and then we can produce useful statistics about that model, or the model is useless and has nothing to do with reality. If the model is useless then there is no point in computing the parameter sensitivities of the model since that information would be useless by definition. The fact of the matter is that real-world stochastic projections (i.e. stochastic-on-stochastic) are required by the insurance regulators and credit rating agencies, even though it can leads to an astronomically huge simulation that typically takes several weeks to complete. So in a purely practical sense these projections are very necessary and useful, if only due to regulations. From a theoretical standpoint, if a single scenario can give you some kind of useful information, then how could multiple scenarios possibly degrade the accuracy or usefulness of that information? QuoteOriginally posted by: ClosetChartistmarkhadley:I recommend that yqaz and jdobiac talk to their dealers and see how they value/manage hybrid risk. They will tell you a lot, although you have to get them past the sales pitch and on to the quant-talk.I'm curious as to what is meant by "hybrid risk?" From the context, it sounds like it just refers to recognizing that an option position is a bet on interest rates, implied vols, etc, and is not simply just a bet on the underlying. QuoteOriginally posted by: ClosetChartistmarkhadley:To jdobiac, I would recommend that you reach out to one of the primary GMWB dealers and see if you can arrange a risk partnership. This is a complex risk and you don't want to cut your hedging teeth on that kind of product. Far better to learn side-by-side with good partner.By "primary GMWB dealers" do you mean the direct writer insurance companies? And by "risk partnership" do you mean one insurance company sharing its trading desk, option models, hedging strategies, software, etc, with another insurance company? Why would any insurance company want share this kind of core intellectual property? The only such partnership that is currently possible in practice, as far as I know, is to enter into a deal with one of the insurance brokers / consultants who offer VA hedging services / platforms to direct writers.
Last edited by
Pannini on August 18th, 2009, 10:00 pm, edited 1 time in total.