June 9th, 2010, 11:43 pm
Hi UVAstudent,That's a very nice article. Original, and thought provoking. However, I don't think it's really useful in practice. In their example it's pretty essential that the structurer knows what the lemons are. If somebody knows this type of things, it's probably easier for them to take advantage of this information directly, than by hiding them in a complicated CDO. Even if for whatever reasons, the person with this information can only exploit it via CDO, the incentive structure on Wall Street is in such does not reward this. That's because a bank doesn't keep two separate sets of books, one with the inside information reflected in the price, and one with the generally available information. If you as a structurer know that the realized loss in a CDO will be higher than everybody else thinks, how will you convince your boss, your market risk department, etc, etc, that you deserve a better bonus, short of making public your information? It's true that one may argue that structurers do this thing subconsciously. Further research may shed more light into this. Anyway, thanks for pointing us to this nice article. Best,V.