February 18th, 2003, 12:17 pm
It seems appropriate I should unravel the mystery of lobbying for some of you.Obviously, your model of lobbying that you pay to get something cannot work, because it is a negative-sum game. Obviously, for instance, the people the government takes money from could afford to spend more money than the people the government gives the money to, and thereby win the decision to let them keep their money!So the question, then, is is the government a positive-sum game, does it act as a pricing and preference-discovery clearinghouse, so that the world is wealthier after they have acted upon your wishes than before? A quick examination of the relative standard of living between countries that have more and less planned economies eliminates any question as to whether this is the case.Does the government redirect wealth from more dispersed interests to more concentrated interests? Yes, they can easily confiscate money from 1,000 people who all live 50 miles from the nearest other member of the group, and give it to 50 people who live on the same block. Because the amount of gas the dispersed people would have to buy to hold a fight-back meeting is more than the amount confiscated.So, in conclusion, lobbying is the natural counter-strategy to a broader pattern extortion. It is the natural tendency of "the government" to take more and more money in a self-perpetuating, ratcheting way, until everythign collpases. But "the government" is a dispersed and clumsy entity, whose general revenues can be outweighed by concentrated expenditures on individual, concentrated congressmen.You don't have to pay "the mob" $1,000, if you can pay their local agent on the street $500 to say you don't exist. And all lobbying, and all government transfers, are simply different permutations of this concentration/organization/dispersion incentive structure.Once Cuban Americans are already organized to expend their anti-Castro energies, once their meetingroom rent has already been covered by these perceived benefits, any new purpose to which they might turn their energies is subsidized. Or consider peak-hour commuters, who are the reasons bridges must be six rather than two lanes wide. They are able to win volume token discounts not because the odd evening traveler costs more per trip, but because their per-trip costs of leaning on the bridge-and-toll authority is less.MP