April 1st, 2009, 12:36 pm
QuoteOriginally posted by: MartinghoulI haven't followed this fascinating discussion closely enough, but I have a question that may or may not be tangential.Essentially, it's a sort of chicken/egg discussion that we were having with some of my colleagues. My view is that there's one inherent problem with the theoretical concept of fully deregulated free markets/capitalism. That problem centers around the agency/incentive issues that seem to inevitably arise in markets and eventually lead to bubbles and general pro-cyclical behavior. To me these incentive issues are embedded in free mkts/capitalism by design and all other phenomena, such as excess leverage, are corollaries. My colleague, on the other hand, insisted that, actually, incentive issues would not have arisen in absence of excess liquidity. His view is that such excess liquidity/leverage is a result of political meddling in the free mkts. Without the meddling, goes his opinion, the free mkt would have been able to allocate capital efficiently, which would have prevented excess liquidity, which, in turn, would ensure that incentive issues had no fertile soil to flourish in.Do people here have a view on this chicken/egg issue? Again, apologies if I am inadvertently hijacking this thread. It's not my intent, as I think my question is related.Agency/incentive issues occur in all human systems, not just markets. Anytime the positive and negative consequences of an act are separated in either time or space, the agents have incentives for "misbehavior". These can occur inside organizations, bureaucracies, dictatorships, socialist system, capitalist systems, etc. In theory, a free market and transparency can reduce some types of agency/incentive problems assuming that the bad consequences follow sufficiently closely that the market can learn that Agent X provides low quality, is a scam, etc.If the positive consequences of actions become too salient and too persistent relative to the negative consequences (e.g., everyone's making a profit), then the feedback mechanism of the market can fail (Note: other economic/decision-making systems will have this same problem too because they have even poorer feedback mechanisms than do markets). For example, the deeply held belief that housing could only appreciate in price (pumped by post-dot-com flight-to-quality and central bank interest rate policies) created the perfect environment for the housing bubble.I do tend to agree that excess liquidity was a strong driver of the housing bubble but I see it as part of a self-amplifying condition rather than chicken-egg. The peculiarities of housing (in which the monthly cost of the house is proportional to the interest rate but the price of the house can be inversely proportional to the interest rate) means that a declining interest rate environment can create a self-amplifying asset price dynamic. The very natural (and rational!) assumption that a rising price is indicative of rising value then serves as a confirmation and incentive to allocate still greater amounts of capital to that sector. And in allocating increasing amounts of capital to a sector, the excess supply of capital induces further declines in interest rates. But I'd also add that the rise of China contributed to the housing bubble because the massive deflation of consumer goods from Asia masked the massive inflation induced by excess liquidity.One additional factor that is a serious problem for all democratic systems (including market-capitalist systems) is the confounding role of transparency via low-cost telecommunications in exacerbating incentive problems. The internet makes it too easy for participants to find "the best" choice. That sounds like a blessing for improving efficient allocation, but it creates a winner-take-all environment which creates intense selection pressure to appear to be "the best." In the context of housing, it created massive incentives to offer ever-lower interest rates, ever-lower down-payments, and ever-more lax documentation terms. In the context of housing, lenders had overwhelming incentives to offer ARMs and negative amortization loans and borrowers had overwhelming incentives (and abilities) to find and use these instruments.
Last edited by
Traden4Alpha on March 31st, 2009, 10:00 pm, edited 1 time in total.