April 15th, 2007, 9:24 pm
REZ:Well, it sounds pretty stupid idea but....we have some "krazy" idea that the behavior of managers is not quite aligned as it should be with stockholders' regarding the risk tasking of projects..that is, we think that since managers stakes at losing their jobs (perks, etc.) in the company is higher than the stake that many stockholders have (most of then proxies voters in any case and some do not even count as managers control goes).So, if managers are more scared to loose their jobs and have, (basic assumption here) much better information than outsider stockholders about the firms' projects risk...they would discard (more often than not) projects that would benefit stockholders but are too risky... from managers view.So, standard theory goes, the solution to align interest is: the manager becomes a stocholder (or similar situation, ergo, give them options)...but then, if the managers biggest stake is in the firm,,,to give them more stakes on the same firm would only give them more reasons to avoid projects that would benefit stockholders (themselves included) but would not be of much more benefit to managers as they still face loosing their bigger interest (employment).Some questions here to be answered (hopefully??):1) Is stardard theory correct? Meaning, giving managers options really align them with stockholder's interests?2) If No. 1 answer is yes (should be)..how much "stockholder interest" is neeed to overcome the possibility of loosing their job? (How many options, of what kind maybe???) or when does exactly the manager becomes a stocholder? One option, ten..maybe one thousand?? On what factors does this "Alignment" depends (company size??? )3) Would it be the case that instead of "aligning" the managers interest, when they become stockholders as well, their interest goes the other way around? Do they become even more risk adverse?? After all, now they DO have even more to loose, don't you think? 4) If No. 3 answer is yes (who the heck knows?) then, to provide options from others firms (that is, to diversify the managers' portfolio if they do a good job) could be a better solution? Maybe, give them puts of a rival firm??I was thinking (well, I am not sure I was, when this idea came up and I decide to join the group of rebels)...in any case, I think that a model MUST be quantitative here...a simulation that shows results similar to what we should observe..that is, we give our "managers" options of our firm ten if the do their job (stock price goes up) when presented (INPUT) with different projects measured by their level of risk (least say managers risk: low, middle, high and stockholder risk: low, middle, high..and of course their interactions (LL,LM, LH, ML,MM,MH, HL,HM,HH)....and then compare the simulation results...Managers are expected to select projects with low risk from the stockholders view, not their view . Other factor might be include as well (maybe) .Then, the bomb...we switch...We give the managers option FROM A different firm than ours...and we se what happen then... Well, I haven't figured it out yet in detail...we just discussed the idea last Thursday, OK? We also where pretty drunk... So I am just toying with the idea...but something in that line I think should be the correct procedure..and I DO feel that agent-based modeling is the way to test the thing.Well, you can laugh now but...help is greatly appreciate it!!M
Last edited by
Maelo on April 14th, 2007, 10:00 pm, edited 1 time in total.