July 6th, 2004, 4:13 pm
Vanguard Fund outgrew Magellan for the first time on April 4, 2000. An historic market collapse ensued. Why? Because the great scam artist, John Bogle, had more zombies hanging on his non-stop televised lectures about index funds outperforming active managers, than Big Brother. But is how active managers, holding the same stocks in the same year, performed relative to index funds, really a relevant measure or valid prediction of how index investors would have done if they had instead invested in actively managed stocks? Obviously not. Because the index investors and the active investors would have both invested in a different portfolio had some of those index investors chosen instead to stock-pick.The objective of active managers is to choose a different portfolio of companies from the ones chosen by Standard & Poors. Put more simply, would the same portfolio of productive capacity come into existence if people were actively steering that portfolio, as compared to if it were merely sequence of random states, as a function of the portfolio in the previous period? Probably not. Nobody in an index or otherwise, can ever be smarter than the average person. But an S&P 500 composed of stocks A, B, and C, obviously will perform differently from an S&P 500 composed of stocks X, Y, and Z. The purpose of active managers is to make everbody smarter, in effect, by finding the best combination. The more people are doing the more research about which industries to capitalize, the more novel and diverse the set of investment opportunities which can be discovered. Specifically, the objective of active as compared to index managers, is not simply to rotate funds in and out of the most highly capitalized subset at a higher rate, but to select and capitalize the emerging subset sooner. Index investors had no choice but to hold the same 500 companies as the S&P went from 1500 to 800. With more active management, that subset would have been sold down and replaced sooner. But for some nitwit who assumes a static pool of investments since the dawn of time under arbitrage pricing theory, this process is invisible.Let's suppose that, for every investor that switches $100 from an index fund to an active fund, returns on the S&P 500 go up by .000001%. So by switching to actively managed, that investor increases his returns .000001%, and increases his management fees by 1%. In other words, everybody makes more money, but one individual bears the cost. The problem then, obviously, is a lack of payment flowing to the people who mine, create, and extract information and insights, and flowing from the people who enjoy the benefits of an efficient stock market. The problem is the lack of a payment structure, to prop up a supply chain to increase the pool of "all known information" which is reflected in stock prices.The solution, for obvious reasons, is less disclosure - which will produce more information. And what makes that solution obvious, you ask? Easy. Markets are extremely efficient. For a large inefficiency to be sitting there like an elephant in the living room, just waiting to be overcome, people would have to be blinded to it by an enormous cloud of superstition. Find the most intuitive, most seducitve, most widespread superstition, and you will find the area where people can be distracted from the path of efficiency for the longest time, in spite of all costs. In reality, when nobody is required by law to tell anybody anything, is when people will have to pay for - and make a profit paying for - what they want to know.The job of a mutual fund manager is not to take the same information everyone else has, and make a better prediction based on it. We do not need 10,000 people predicting the weather. The job of a mutual fund manager must be to extract and manufacture new information which no on else has - private information. Who does better in blackjack, a smarter person, or a person who has seen a few more cards come off the deck? Between thinking really hard, and getting new information, it is obvious which pursuit pays better returns. The mutual fund manager then must get paid for that information by investors who otherwise would not have any access to it.Ultimately, the comparison is, do investors do better investing in an index collective, or hiring managers such as Warren Buffet to develop inside relationships, and manufacture asymmetric information? People in a collective always do better for themselves, the less work they do - once you are in a collective. But people in a collective also always do worse, for having entered into a collective in the first place. The problem investors face, is not one of choosing between existing investments, but one of inventing the new pool of investment opportunities each day. This problem is best solved not by investing in yesterday's best capitalized company, but by paying for people who invent secrets.